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In this paper I study how the make-or-buy decision of a ﬁrm depends on the organi-
zation of its peers. I consider a multi-ﬁrm framework in which ﬁrms choose whether to
integrate into the supply of an intermediate input or to outsource its production, and
choose the size of their supplier network if outsourcing. Firms ﬁnd it optimal to share
the same set of suppliers, as there are economies of scope in investment to suppliers
taking multiple designs. These economies are due to spillovers of technical or opera-
tional know-how between projects and to savings in the setup costs on physical capital.
The model admits multiple vertical equilibria that are Pareto-ranked, the one with the
highest level of outsourcing being most eﬃcient. Outsourcing is more likely in larger
markets and when the economies of scope are stronger. The size of the optimal supplier
network however typically decreases when the spillovers are stronger. These ﬁndings
provide insight into the patterns of reorganization of vertical supply relations observed
over the last two decades.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ample evidence suggests that the way ﬁrms organize their supplies of intermediate inputs
is inﬂuenced by the business environment they operate in. For example, Chinitz (1961)
documents that input outsourcing is more prevalent in larger markets, and Holmes (1999)
ﬁnds that ﬁrms located in concentrations of same industry plants are more likely to buy
inputs on the outside. Indeed, a ﬁrm’s decision to outsource the production of an input is
likely to hinge upon factors such as the number and quality of potential suppliers, which
are determined, to a great extent, by the demand for outsourcing services by other ﬁrms.
Presumably, the thicker the market for outsourcing services, the more numerous are the
potential suppliers, and the higher the level of available expertise.
Somewhat surprisingly, the mechanisms at work are rarely discussed in the literature
on vertical organization of ﬁrms. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap. The analysis also sheds
light on the dramatic reorganization of vertical supply relations that has taken place over
the last two decades. A substantial increase in outsourcing of services (examples include
accounting, legal and ﬁnancial services, logistic management, call centers and many more)
has been documented across many industries in the US and worldwide.1 Several authors2
have argued that the increase in outsourcing was accompanied by an adoption of Japanese-
like system of supplier relations by US manufacturers, of which one of the main attributes
is a reduction in the number of suppliers. This paper is unique in studying both the extent
of outsourcing and the determination of supplier networks within a uniﬁed framework. As
a result, I am able to explore how these two organizational features depend on the same
characteristics of the environment.
Below I develop a theoretical framework in which a ﬁrm’s make-or-buy trade-oﬀ is
aﬀected by the organization of its peers. I consider a multi-ﬁrm model where each ﬁrm
requires a similar intermediate input. A ﬁrm can either manufacture the input in-house
or outsource its production, but outsourcing is not limited to a single supplier. Each
outsourcing ﬁrm can establish a supplier network and divide its orders of the input among its
members. The interdependency between diﬀerent ﬁrms’ decisions stems from the fact that it
is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms to share suppliers with their peers. The reason is that suppliers achieve
economies of scope by taking designs from several ﬁrms. Such economies are either due to
spillovers of technical and operational know-how between projects for diﬀerent buyers, or
to the amortization of one-time setup costs of physical capital over a larger group of clients.
1See Abraham and Taylor (1996), Feenstra (1998) and numerous references in the business press.
2For example McMillan (1995).
2Firms do not however interact in the product market, and strategic considerations, such as
those explored in the literature on vertical foreclosure, are therefore absent.3
In this framework, a simple and intuitive relation between the outsourcing decisions
of diﬀerent buyers is established; the eﬃciency of outsourcing increases with the number
of outsourcing ﬁrms. Positive externalities between ﬁrms’ outsourcing decisions result in a
multiplicity of organizational structures in equilibrium. Equilibria diﬀer in the share of ﬁrms
that outsource, the size of the supplier networks, and in the level of relationship-speciﬁc
investments made by each of the parties. Admitting multiple organizational equilibria, our
multi-ﬁrm model is capable of capturing diﬀerences between industrial systems that cannot
be easily attributed to the underlying characteristics of diﬀerent bilateral relationships,4 and
hence are not likely to be present in single-ﬁrm models of the make-or-buy decision. In line
with the empirical ﬁndings cited above, we show that outsourcing is more prevalent in larger
markets. Within our framework, both an increase in outsourcing and a reduction in the size
of supplier networks can be attributed to stronger spillovers between designs, possibly due
to improved codiﬁcation of organizational know-how using information technology. Last
I address the relation between the organization of supply and the design of intermediate
inputs and ﬁnal outputs. Anecdotal evidence (discussed below) suggests that outsourcing
is often associated with an increase in the standardization of intermediate inputs. Such
standardization potentially diminishes the value of the ﬁnal product, and can constrain
ﬁrms ability to diﬀerentiate themselves. I show how such considerations ﬁt within the
general framework.
My model is in the tradition of the Property Rights Theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995)), emphasizing the importance of
relationship-speciﬁc investments to the organization of supply relations. Firms are unable
to write and enforce explicit outsourcing delivery contracts for the input, and the organi-
zational mode determines the ex-ante investment incentives. The emphasis here is however
not on assets’ ownership as in the papers mentioned above but on access as in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). Firms control the access to their design’s blueprint, and can decide on the
size of their supplier network. Granting access to more suppliers mitigates the ﬁrm’s fears
of being held up and strengthens its incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments
but at the same time dilutes the incentives of the suppliers. There are only a few other
3This assumption allows us to focus solely on the interaction between ﬁrms’ supply decisions. In an
extension to this paper, Levy (2003), I explore the implications of introducing product market competition
between the ﬁrms.
4Comparative studies of industrial structure have revealed stark diﬀerences in organization of supply
between similar industries in relatively similar countries. See McLaren (2000) for several examples.
3papers in this literature that go beyond the bilateral framework (single buyer and a sin-
gle supplier) and those do not consider the same interdependency among ﬁrms examined
here. Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a general multiparty environment, but they take all
parties’ investments to be complements to each other. Such an assumption is not plausible
for the description of competing suppliers. Substitute investments are discussed in Bolton
and Whinston (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). Unlike here however, in both of these
papers the number of suppliers is exogenously ﬁxed.
Two recent papers consider research questions similar to those pursued here. McLaren
(2000) explore why an increased openness to trade can increase the extent of domestic
outsourcing. Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop a general equilibrium model of indus-
trial vertical structure that can be used to explain the growth in international outsourcing.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these papers and the current one. First, while both
papers employ a multi-ﬁrm equilibrium framework, they limit the organization of supply
to bilateral arrangements. Second, there are no bilateral ex-ante investments in the sense
the Property Rights literature. Finally, in both of these papers ﬁrms do not share suppliers
so the eﬀects of spillovers analyzed here are absent. The factors determining the ranking
of alternative organizations are therefore very diﬀerent than here, and my results can be
viewed as complementary to theirs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces general nota-
tion. Section 3 considers the organization of supply of a single ﬁrm in isolation, ignoring
suppliers’ economies of scope from taking the designs of multiple ﬁrms. This analysis is of
independent interest, as most discussions of the make-or-buy decision do not address the
determination of the optimal size of the supplier network of outsourcing ﬁrms. Section 4
introduces the full ﬂedged multi-ﬁrm setup, with economies of scope in suppliers invest-
ment. It is shown that integration provides better incentives for ﬁrms’ investment than
outsourcing, but the gap is reduced the more suppliers are employed under outsourcing. An
outsourcing arrangement is better in promoting suppliers’ investment, and its advantages
are magniﬁed due to economies of scope in investment, the more outsourcing ﬁrms there are.
Section 5 characterizes the properties of vertical equilibria, and discusses the multiplicity
of organizational equilibria. Equilibria are shown to be Pareto-ranked, the one with the
highest level of outsourcing being most eﬃcient. Section 6 presents the results of several
comparative statics exercises. It is shown that outsourcing is more likely in bigger markets,
and that it is more pervasive when the share of spillovers between designs and the level of
setup cost savings is higher. The two types of savings have opposite eﬀects on the optimal
4size of the supplier network. It expands when there are larger savings in setup costs but
typically shrinks when the spillovers are stronger.
In section 7, I look at a case where positive spillovers occur only if the input is partially
standardized. Standardization diminishes the value of the ﬁnal product of the buyer by
a ﬁxed amount, but can lead to signiﬁcant cost savings. I show that this formulation ﬁts
easily into my framework. Standardization and outsourcing are pervasive in some equilibria
and scant in others. Finally in section 8 I discuss alternatives to some of the main modeling
assumptions.
2 Notation and General Structure
M downstream buyers (ﬁrms) B1,B 2,...,B M, each require exactly one unit of an interme-
diate upstream input. The values of the buyers’ ﬁnal outputs are independent of each other
(buyers do not compete with one another in the product market).5 The process through
which buyers decide how to organize their supply of the input is described by a multistage
game, whose sequence of events is outlined below:
Integration/Outsourcing decisions: Each buyer decides whether to integrate into
the supply of the input or to outsource it. Denote by m ≤ M the number of buyers who
choose to outsource in equilibrium. Each integrating buyer pays a setup cost K>0.
Access: The access stage consists of a single round of oﬀers in which each of the m
outsourcing buyers simultaneously approaches a subset of all potential suppliers with access
oﬀers. Access oﬀers are publicly observed. An access oﬀer to supplier j speciﬁes a fee F
j
i
to be paid to the buyer, and its acceptance grants the supplier access to the blueprint of
the input required by the buyer.6 Let Si denote the set of suppliers accepting Bi’s access
oﬀer and ni = |Si| denote their number. Each supplier has to invest an identical setup cost
K per oﬀer accepted. Suppliers may work with several buyers.
Investment: At the beginning of the investment stage, the identity of all suppliers
accepting oﬀers becomes public. Managers of the upstream and downstream units then make
5While this assumption mainly serves to focus on the interaction between decisions on the organization of
supply, there are nevertheless certain circumstances in which it seems reasonable. For example when ﬁrms’
territories are geographically segmented, or when the ﬁrms are in diﬀerent lines of business but use some
similar inputs.
6It is therefore implicitly assumed that suppliers are not cash-constrained and that access is contractible.
A similar assumption is made for example in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
5design-speciﬁc investments. Downstream investment increases the value of the intermediate
input to the buyer, whereas upstream investment lowers the cost of producing it. Denote








the investment proﬁle of the ni independent suppliers if Bi outsources.
Investments are non-monetary and bear a disutility ψ (x) to the managers who undertake
them, where x is the investment level and ψ0 > 0,ψ 00 > 0e v e r y w h e r e . 7 Investment levels
are observed by the buyer and all of the suppliers, but are non-contractible in the sense of
Hart (1995).
Multilateral bargaining and production: Employing the unit of intermediate input,
Bi produces and sells a ﬁnal product, bearing revenues
v(bi)=αBbi,
where αB ∈ R+. A supplier j ∈ Si can produce x
j
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i.V a r i a b l e
costs are strictly convex in x
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where αS ∈ R+ and b c(0) = 0, b c0 > 0, and b c00 is bounded above zero on [0,1].8
The production of the unit of intermediate input required by the buyer can be di-
vided between suppliers. If, conditional on investments si, production is eﬃciently allocated
among a non-empty subset P of Si, then the aggregate cost of production of the unit of
intermediate output is

























By the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge 1959), c∗ (si,P) is continuous in si,a n dxi (si,P)
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maximizer xi (si,P) is continuous and its partial derivatives with respect to the elements
of si exist.9. Finally, suppliers’ production costs are additive across buyers and hence if j











7The speciﬁcation is somewhat diﬀerent under integration. See section 3.2.
8I discuss the implications of working with alternative speciﬁcations of the cost function in footnote 11
a n di ns e c t i o n8b e l o w .
9An e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient condition for the partial derivatives of xi (si,P) to exist is that the bordered
Hessian matrix,
6The mutual surplus of vertical structure i (consisting of a buyer Bi and its supplier
network, Si), taking investment costs as sunk, is given by:
v(bi) − c∗ (si,S i).
This surplus is always positive, for all levels of investments.
Outsourcing buyers bargain with their pool of suppliers over the division of these rents
from trade. We take an axiomatic approach to the determination of the bargaining outcome:
the share of this surplus each party receives is determined by its respective Shapley value.
We outline these shares explicitly below.
3 Single Buyer/Many Suppliers
We begin by considering the manner in which a single buyer Bi chooses to organize its
supply in isolation. We analyze and compare two modes of organization: outsourcing to
multiple suppliers versus vertical integration and internal supply. We defer to the next
section the analysis of interdependence between organizational choices made by diﬀerent
buyers.
3.1 Outsourcing
The game is analyzed backwards, starting from the bargaining stage.
3.1.1 Bargaining and Production
Assume that Bi has invested bi in its design, that a set Si of suppliers has been given access
to it, and that each j ∈ Si has invested s
j
i in cost-reduction. Production is then allocated
eﬃciently between the suppliers and the mutual surplus, v(bi) − c∗ (si,S i), is divided by
the parties according to their respective Shapley values. The buyer’s share is deﬁned as
the sum of its marginal contributions to all possible coalitions that include any non-empty
subset P of the potential suppliers:
φi (bi,s i) ≡
P
P⊆Si,P6=∅
[v(bi) − c∗ (si,P)] · (|P|)!(ni − |P|)!
(ni +1 ) !
. (2)
























   

has full rank, where n = |P|. This condition is clearly satisﬁed as b c
00 > 0o n[ 0 ,1].
7The marginal contribution of supplier j is positive only for coalitions that include Bi as
well. Deﬁne mj (si,P) as the marginal contribution of j to a coalition that includes Bi and









if P = φ,
c∗ (si,P) − c∗ (si,P∪ j) otherwise.
(3)
The Shapley value of each supplier j ∈ Si is given by
φ
j
i (bi,s i) ≡
P
P⊆Si\j mj (si,P) · (|P| +1 ) !( ni − |P| − 1)!
(ni +1 ) !
. (4)
3.1.2 Investments
Anticipating the bargaining outcomes outlined above, each party decides on its investment
level. We turn now to characterize equilibrium investments in this subgame.10
A buyer Bi investment is a solution to
max
bi
φi (bi,s i) − ψ(bi). (5)
Diﬀerentiating (2) above, the marginal return to a buyer’s investment is then:

























coalitions with |P| = k
suppliers.











































(|P| +1 ) !( ni − |P| − 1)!
(ni +1 ) !
,
10The strict quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ f u n c t i o n si no w ni n v e s t m e n t sa n dt h e i rc o n t i n u i t yi n( bi,s i)























As the constraint set of the production allocation problem (1) does not depend on the
investment proﬁle, si, the envelope theorem implies



































(|P| +1 ) !( ni − |P| − 1)!






As suppliers are symmetric, the equilibrium investments are symmetric as well , s
j
i = sO







Given symmetric investments, the cost-minimizing allocation of input production between







|P|, ∀j ∈ P. Substi-















(|P| +1 ) !( ni − |P| − 1)!






The marginal contribution of an additional identical supplier to a coalition containing
the buyer and a subset P of size k of Si is a function of the number of suppliers k only.
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Consider next the second-order conditions for the investment problems. The global
concavity of the buyer’s program is assured as ψ00 > 0 everywhere. In the appendix we
derive the second-order condition for the supplier’s problem and show that the following





Assumption 1 ψ00 (s) >
(αS)2
2∗inf{b c00(x)|x∈[0,1]} everywhere.
The next Proposition summarizes the results above and characterizes the equilibrium
investments:
Proposition 1 There exists a symmetric equilibrium for the investment subgame for which
investments under outsourcing are bi = bO (ni) and s
j
i = sO (ni) for all j ∈ Si, characterized
by the ﬁrst-order conditions:
ni
ni +1






αS − ψ0 ¡
sO¢
=0 , (10)
The equilibrium investments satisfy the following properties:
1. A buyer’s investment is increasing in the number of suppliers (ni).
2. Each supplier’s investment is decreasing in the number of suppliers (ni) .
Proof. Given the concavity of the objectives, the equilibrium is characterized by the
ﬁrst-order conditions of (5) and (7) respectively.













ψ00 (sO)(ni +1 )
2 < 0.
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium investments to the ﬁrst-best investments,
bi = bFB,s
j
i = sFB for all j ∈ Si. These are solutions to





αS − ψ0 ¡
sFB¢
=0 .
As in most Property Rights models (see for example Hart (1995)), both parties under-
invest in relationship-speciﬁc capital compared with the ﬁrst-best levels. With regard to









used.11 We choose to work here with a speciﬁcation that yields under-
investment mainly for resemblance to the bulk of the literature.
Next consider the total surplus, SO (n), net of investment and setup costs, generated by
a vertical structure in the symmetric equilibrium above. We have:
















dn2 . It is easy to see that
dSO(n)
dn < 0f o rn>e n>0 . W h i l ei ti sh a r dt oc h a r a c t e r i z eSO (n)f u r t h e rw i t h o u ta d -
ditional assumptions, we show that for a parametrization of the model with a quadratic
disutility of eﬀort, ψ (x)=x2
2 , the surplus SO (n) is single-peaked in n. While single-
peakedness is likely to hold under plausible restrictions on the model’s primitives, we do
not provide a full characterization of these conditions here. Rather we posit
Assumption 2 SO (n) is single-peaked in n.
11Over-investment is possible when alternative speciﬁcations of the cost function are employed. Supplier’s
gross payoﬀ,( 4 ) ,i saw e i g h t e ds u mo fi t sm a r g i n a lc o n t r i b u t ions to coalitions smaller than the grand one,
in which the share of production allocated to each supplier is higher than in the symmetric social optimum.
For this reason the private return to investment may end up higher than the social return, though not in
the case studied here. It can be shown for example that over-investment would result if c(x,s)=a(s)x
d
where a
0 < 0a n dd ≥ 2.
11While the single-peakedness assumption greatly simpliﬁes the exposition, it is not es-
sential to what follows.
3.1.3 Access
We now consider the optimal choice of access by Bi.12 As access oﬀers are, by assumption,
non-negotiable, Bi can extracts the entire transactional surplus13 using the access fee. If














leaves suppliers exactly indiﬀerent between accepting the oﬀer and rejecting access. The
optimal number of suppliers to be given access to Bi’s design, nO, therefore maximizes the
total surplus, SO.14 Provided that SO (n) is single-peaked as assumed, we deﬁne nO as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1 nO =m a x
©
n ∈ N | SO (n) >S O (n − 1)
ª
3.2 Integration
In the event that Bi integrated upstream into the production of the intermediate input,
Bi’s owner can make investments pertaining to both the downstream and upstream units.
Denote by bi the downstream investment and by si the upstream one. We assume that
the owner’s upstream investment is less eﬃcient than it is in the downstream business, due
either to managerial overload or simply poor understanding of the upstream business.15
12The optimal choice of access in an ”incomplete contracts” setup was ﬁrst studied by Rajan and Zingales
(1998). In their model, in which only suppliers but not the buyer invest ex-ante, it is never optimal for a
buyer grant access to more than one supplier, whenever suppliers’ investments are perfect substitutes.T h e r e
are two main diﬀerences between their analysis and the current one. First, both upstream and downstream
p a r t i e si n v e s th e r e ,a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u mber of suppliers has therefore a positive eﬀect on the investment
incentives of the downstream unit. Second, due to the decreasing returns nature of the input production
technology, suppliers are not perfect substitutes to each other.
13This serves mainly to simplify the exposition.
14If suppliers are cash-constrained, access fees may not be used, and the number of suppliers would be
chosen to maximize the buyer’s bargaining payoﬀ. Another possibility is that access is not contractible, as
the design’s blueprint is readily available to all suppliers and buyers are unable to pre-commit to exclude
suppliers at the bargaining stage. In that case, suppliers may enter freely and their number is determined
by a zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n .
15Our assumptions here depart somewhat from the norm of Property Rights models. There it is typically
assumed that under upstream integration the supply unit is run by a non-owner manager. If such manager
does not enjoy any quasi-rents at the production stage and may be costlessly replaced, he invests nothing.
Such an assumption is made in for example in Bolton and Whinston (1993). Here we implicitly maintain a
similar assumption while allowing the owner to invest (ineﬃciently) by himself.
12Assumption 3 (Ineﬃciency of upstream investment under integration) The disu-
tility of an upstream investment si equals λψ (si) for some λ>1.
λ measures the relative ”ineﬃciency” in upstream investment of the common owner, Bi.
The disutility from downstream investment is ψ(bi) as before.16
The integrated ﬁrm can set multiple production lines for the input, whose number we
denote by li,a tc o s to fK each. Setting up multiple lines may be eﬃcient given the decreasing
returns nature of the input production technology.17 For a given number of production lines
li, investments bi and si maximize
max
bi,si





+ αSsi − ψ(bi) − λψ (si) − liK
The optimal investments, bI, sI then satisfy the following necessary and suﬃcient conditions:





αS − ψ0 ¡
sI¢
=0 . (13)
The bottom ﬁrst-order condition is rearranged to facilitate the comparison to the outsourc-
ing ﬁrst-order conditions, (9)-(10). Under integration, downstream investment is at the
ﬁrst-best level and hence above its outsourcing level. On the other hand, for an equal
number of production facilities under integration and outsourcing, li = ni, the incentives to









The following assumption implies that the incentives for upstream investment are lower
under integration, at least in comparison with the case of outsourcing to a single supplier.
Assumption 4 λ>2.
Finally, the optimal number of lines, lI,t h e ns a t i s ﬁes
lI =a r gm a x
l











16An additional implication of the assumption is that any integrated buyer Bi is inferior compared with
an independent supplier in supplying the needs of any other buyer Bk. This rules out the possibility that
an integrated ﬁr ms u p p l i e ss e v e r a lo fi t sp e e r s .
17This assumption is made to assure that an integrated organization is not inferior to one in which the
production is outsourced to multiple suppliers simply due to technological considerations.
133.3 Comparison Between Organizations
As in the standard bilateral model discussed in the literature (a canonical example is Hart
(1995)), downstream integration in our setup promotes downstream-speciﬁc investment
while outsourcing favors upstream-speciﬁc investment. Which organization would prevail
depends on the magnitude of the diﬀerent eﬀects.
4 Many Buyers/Many Suppliers
We now turn to analyze the full model where M buyers simultaneously choose the organiza-
tion of their supply for the upstream input. The main diﬀerence with the single-buyer case
is that the eﬃciency of outsourcing is determined by the number of buyers that outsource.
The central assumption driving the multi-buyer model is that there are economies of scope
in investment when a supplier takes several designs. We envision two possible types of
savings:
Assumption 5 (Economies of scope of taking multiple designs)
1. The per-design (or average) setup cost K (d) ≥ 0 is decreasing in the number of designs
taken: K0 (d) ≤ 0.
2. Supplier’s investment in one buyer’s design spills over to other designs that it under-
takes. Speciﬁcally we denote the share of investment in one design that spills over by
γ ∈ [0,1].
An example of the ﬁrst type is the installation of an information technology platform
(e.g.: inventory management system) that can be used by a supplier in its transactions
with multiple clients. As an example of the second type, consider a ”process innovation” of
either technological or organizational nature, that lowers the cost of producing the input.
Know-how and experience that has been acquired while working with one buyer may be
applicable to some degree in jobs performed for others.
4.1 Outsourcing
We focus attention on the case where all m outsourcing buyers give access to the same set
of suppliers, Si = {1,...,n} for all i. Below we argue that such a result would indeed emerge
in equilibrium.
144.1.1 Multilateral Bargaining
Given our assumptions, the bargaining between each buyer and members of its supplier
network is independent of other buyers actions. The analysis here is therefore identical
to that of the single buyer case (section 3.1.1), where the investments are interpreted as
including a spillover component. This component is explicitly described in the next section.
4.1.2 Investments
The eﬀective investment of supplier j ∈ {1,...,n}’s in Bi’s design includes spillovers from








k.D e n o t eb ye si the proﬁle
of eﬀective investments and by e s
−j
i the proﬁle of investments by all suppliers except j.








































The buyer Bi solves
max
bi
φi (bi,e si) − ψ(bi). (15)
Analogous to Proposition 1, one can show the following:
Proposition 2 Given that m ≤ M buyers outsource and all give access to an identical
set of suppliers {1,...,n}, there exists a symmetric equilibrium for the investment subgame
for which investments are bi = bO (n) and s
j
i = sO (m,n) ∀i ∈ {1,...,m}, ∀j ∈ {1,...,n},
characterized by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
n
n +1






αS (1 + γ (m − 1)) − ψ0 ¡
sO¢
=0 . (17)
The equilibrium investments satisfy the following properties:
1. Buyer’s investment is increasing in the number of suppliers (n)
2. Suppliers’ investments are decreasing in the number of suppliers (n)
3. Suppliers’ investments are increasing in the spillover share (γ)
4. Suppliers’ investments are increasing in the number of outsourcing buyers (m)
15Let e sO (m,n)=sO (m,n)[1+γ (m − 1)] denote the equilibrium eﬀective investment per
buyer and e sO (m,n) the proﬁle of symmetric eﬀective investments.18 Deﬁne SO (m,n)a s
the equilibrium surplus of a vertical structure comprised of a single buyer and n suppliers















− nK (m). (18)
As in the single buyer case, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 6 SO (m,n) is single-peaked in n for every m.












= αSγe sO +
£
αS (1 + γ (m − 1)) − nψ0¤ ∂sO
∂m
− nK0 (m).
The ﬁrst and third terms above are always positive. To sign the second term, note that one
can rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition, (17), as
αS (1 + γ (m − 1)) − (n +1 )ψ0 ¡
sO¢
=0 ,
the sign of the second term equals that of ψ0 ¡
sO¢








In the access stage, the m outsourcing buyers simultaneously approach suppliers with access
oﬀers. The access game generally admits a multiplicity of equilibria. We focus attention
on one in which the m outsourcing buyers oﬀer access to the same set of nO (m) suppliers,
where
nO (m)=m a x
©
n ∈ N | SO (m,n) >S O (m,n − 1)
ª
.
Each buyer sets an identical access fee, F
j
i = FO, to all suppliers where
FO = φ
j
i (b∗,e s∗) − ψ(s∗) − K (m),
b∗ = bO ¡
nO (m)
¢
, s∗ = sO ¡
nO (m),m
¢




. The access fee stipulated
leaves suppliers exactly indiﬀerent between accepting the oﬀer or rejecting it. Their expected
18For brevity, I omit n and m when referring to the equilibrium investments if appropriate.




i (b∗,e s∗) − ψ(s∗) − K (m) − FO =0 .
The buyers therefore extract the entire transactional surplus.
By the single-peakedness assumption, nO (m) is the number of suppliers, each with m−1
additional designs, that maximizes the surplus per vertical structure. As buyers extract the
entire surplus, and if restricted to choose only such suppliers, each buyer would give access
to nO (m) of them if possible. In the proposed equilibrium above, in which all ﬁrms choose
identical suppliers, exactly nO (m) such suppliers are indeed available.
In the most general setting however, it is not straightforward that the buyers would
indeed ﬁnd it optimal to give access to the same set of suppliers as their peers. Two
oﬀsetting eﬀects are at work. First, as a supplier’s average setup cost per design is decreasing
in the overall number of designs undertaken, and as suppliers’ investment is increasing (by
proposition 2), a supplier’s direct contribution to the surplus is increasing in the number
of designs it undertakes. If there are no spillovers, γ =0 ,t h i si st h eo n l ye ﬀect. However,
when γ>0, because suppliers’ investments are strategic substitutes to each other, the
increase in supplier’s incentives to invest due to taking more designs has an adverse eﬀect
on investments by all other suppliers. This indirect eﬀect favors giving access to suppliers
with fewer designs.
In the appendix we develop a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which the direct
eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect everywhere. In a nutshell this requires the suppliers’
best responses in the investment stage not to be too sensitive. In what follows we assume
that this is the case.19 Then, it is easy to verify that in all equilibria, suppliers oﬀer access
to the same set of suppliers, and that the number of suppliers given access is no more than
nO (m).20 The equilibrium we focus on Pareto-dominates all other possible equilibria with
as SO (m,n) is single-peaked in n.
T h en e x tp o i n tr e g a r d st h ew a yt h enO (m), the size of the outsourcing buyers’ supplier
network changes with the number of outsourcing ﬁrms, m. Again there are two oﬀsetting
eﬀects. This may be seen by looking at how ∂SO (m,n)/∂n changes with m.A si ss h o w n
19Also in section 8 we outline an alternative modelling approach that overcomes these diﬃculties assuming
that access oﬀers are hidden and only observed by the recipients.
20Suppose Bi employs a supplier j that is not employed by Bk. There are two possible cases: If Bk
employs another supplier l that is not employed by Bi,t h e ne i t h e rBi is better oﬀ switching from j to l or
Bk better oﬀ switching from l to j. Otherwise if , without loss of generality, the set of suppliers employed
(optimally) by Bi is strict superset of that employed by Bk, then as buyers are identical, Bk should give





















As the average setup cost per design decreases with the number of designs, K0 (m) < 0,
this eﬀect favors additional suppliers as m increases. On the other hand, provided there
are positive spillovers (γ>0), an increase in m may favor a smaller number of suppliers
per buyer. As is shown in the appendix, a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for the
eﬀect due to spillovers (the ﬁrst term, in brackets) to be negative is ψ000 ≤ 0. The intuition
f o rt h i sl a t t e re ﬀect is that as m increases, the marginal decrease in investment by each of
the infra-marginal suppliers due to an additional one is higher.
For the two polar cases in which only one of these eﬀects is present we get the following
result
Lemma 1









Finally we denote the surplus per outsourcing buyer in the m-buyers’ symmetric equi-
librium outlined above by




By our assumptions this surplus is also the proﬁt per buyer.
Lemma 2 SO (m) is increasing in m.
Proof. For every m,
SO (m +1 )− SO (m)
= SO ¡








m +1 ,n O (m +1 )
¢
− SO ¡











18The ﬁrst term in brackets above is non-negative by the deﬁnition of nO (m +1 ) . T h a t
the second term is positive as well follows from the fact established above that
∂SO(m,n)
∂m
> 0 for all m,n.
The equilibrium surplus per buyer from outsourcing is increasing in the number of
outsourcing buyers. The signiﬁcance this result becomes clear in the next section where we
characterize the equilibria of the entire game and show that equilibria diﬀer in the number
of outsourcing ﬁrms m and hence in their overall eﬃciency.
4.2 Integration
As buyers do not interact in the downstream market, the analysis of integration in the
many buyers case is completely analogous to that of the single buyer model (section 3.2).
It is worth emphasizing however that in comparison with outsourcing, integration is further
disadvantaged due to the existence of economies of scope to suppliers under outsourcing.
This can be seen by comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing upstream investment
under integration, (13), and under outsourcing, (17).
5 Vertical Equilibria
In this section we turn to analyze the ex-ante choice of organizational mode by buyers and
characterize the ensuing equilibria of the complete game. A choice between outsourcing
and upstream integration foresees a play of the continuation equilibrium outlined above,
and the tradeoﬀ between the diﬀerent modes of organization can be summarized as follows:
An integrated organization provides better incentives for downstream investment than out-
sourcing. However the gap is reduced with an increase in the buyer’s network of suppliers.
An outsourcing arrangement is advantageous at promoting upstream investment, but the
advantage is dampened by increasing the size of the supplier network. The advantages of
outsourcing are also magniﬁed when suppliers takes the designs of multiple buyers, due to
economies of scope in investment.
Recall from section 3.2 that a buyer Bi’s relative ineﬃciency in upstream investment is
denoted by λi. To assess the implications of buyers’ heterogeneity, we assume that buyers
may diﬀer in the ineﬃciency of their upstream investment.21 Formally:
Assumption 7 (Heterogeneity in cost of integration) λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ .... ≥ λM > 2.
21Heterogeneity between ﬁr m si sp o s s i b l ea l o n go t h e rd i m e n s i o n sa sw e l l ,e . g . :t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo f
a ﬁrm’s investment compared to its suppliers’ and so on.
19Bi’s choice of organizational mode is then determined by the diﬀerence in surplus between
integration and outsourcing,
∆(m,λi) ≡ SI (λi) − SO (m). (21)
Buyer Bi integrates if ∆(m,λi) > 0 and outsources otherwise.
Lemma 3 ∆(m,λi) is decreasing in m and decreasing in λi.
Proof. That ∆(m,λi) is decreasing in m follows immediately as SO (m)w a ss h o w n
increasing in m (lemma 2). As SI (λi) was shown decreasing in λi in section 3.2, ∆(m,λi)
is decreasing in λi.
The marginal buyer, λ(m), implicitly deﬁned by ∆(m,λ(m)) = 0, is indiﬀerent between
integration and outsourcing given that m−1 other buyers outsource. A buyer Bi outsources
if and only if it is relatively ineﬃcient under integration, that is if λi ≥ λ(m). Clearly given
lemma 3, λ(m)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nm.
The next deﬁnition characterizes the stable organizations of the set of buyers:
Deﬁnition 2 (Vertical equilibrium) A partition of the set of buyers into O ⊆ {B1,...,B M},
the set of outsourcing buyers, and I = {B1,...,B M}\O, the set of integrating buyers, is a
vertical equilibrium if
∆(|O|,λ i) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ O,
and
∆(|O| +1 ,λ i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
Proposition 3 All vertical equilibria of the game can be characterized as follows:
For some m ∈ {1,...,M},b u y e r s{B1,...,B m} outsource and buyers {Bm+1,...,B M}
integrate into the supply of the input.
Proof. We need only to prove that if Bj outsources then every Bi, i<joutsources as
well. Now suppose to the contrary that ∃i,j such that λi >λ j,w i t hj ∈ O but i ∈ I.T h i s
implies that
∆(|O|,λ j) ≤ 0,
∆(|O| +1 ,λ i) > 0.
But applying the results of lemma 3:










Figure 1: Multiplicity of vertical equilibria - Illustration
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from part one of the lemma and the second inequality
from the second part, as λi >λ j. Hence a contradiction.
As λ(m)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nm,ac o n ﬁguration O = {B1,...,B m}, I = {Bm+1,...,B M} is an
equilibrium organization if and only if λm ≥ λ(m)a n dλm+1 <λ(m + 1). With heteroge-
neous buyers the model therefore potentially admits a multiplicity of vertical equilibria.A n
illustration of this possibility is given in Figure 1. In this example there are two equilibria:
one with two outsourcing ﬁrms, O = {B1,B 2}, and a second with four outsourcing ﬁrms,
O = {B1,B 2,B 3,B 4}.
Mixed equilibria with both integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms appears however only if
there is a strict heterogeneity across ﬁrms, that is if λ1 6= λM. If the buyers are homogenous
(λ1 = λM), the only possible equilibria are: all integration and all outsourcing.




M if λM ≥ λ(M),
max
m {m ∈ 1..M − 1 | λm ≥ λ(m) and λm+1 <λ(m +1 ) } otherwise.
21The maximal outsourcing equilibrium conﬁguration is then
O = {B1,...,B m},I= {B1,...,B M}\O
In lemma 2 we established that the surplus under outsourcing is increasing in the number
of outsourcing ﬁrms, m. As the surplus under integration is not aﬀected by other buyers’
organizational choices, equilibria are therefore Pareto-ranked in m. Equilibria with a higher
number of outsourcing ﬁrms are superior to those with lower number. As is argued in
the previous section, the eﬀect of m on the equilibrium size of the suppliers network of
outsourcing buyers is ambiguous in general.
Finally, in order to make some comparisons between the levels of investments in diﬀerent
equilibria, we proceed by looking at the two polar cases separately.
Lemma 4
1. If there are only spillover eﬀects (K0 (m)=0 )and ψ000 ≤ 0, the equilibrium down-
stream investment under outsourcing bO (m) is decreasing with m and the upstream
investment sO (m) per supplier is increasing with m.
2. If there are only setup cost savings (γ =0 ) , the downstream investment under out-





















1. Whenever K0 (m)=0a n dψ000 ≤ 0, it is shown in lemma 1 that no (m) is decreasing
in m. Applying the results of proposition 2, we get dbo
dm < 0a n ddso
dm > 0.
2. When γ =0 , it was shown in lemma 1 that no (m)i si n c r e a s i n gi nm.T h u s b y a
similar logic to the above, dbo
dm > 0. It is impossible to sign dso
dm in the same way as the
ﬁrst and second eﬀects work in opposite directions.
The multiplicity of equilibria demonstrates that very diﬀerent patterns of industry ver-
tical organization can arise from similar starting conditions. Indeed, comparative studies of
22industrial structure have revealed stark diﬀerences in organization between similar indus-
tries in relatively similar countries.22 While these diﬀerences may also be attributed to other
institutional details, the results here suggest that this prevalence may be an implication of
the externalities between ﬁrms’ decisions outlined above.
6 Comparative Statics
In this section we present comparative statics results with respect to several of the main
parameters of the model. At times, we analyze the changes in the maximal outsourcing
equilibrium described above. This equilibrium was shown to be Pareto-superior to all other
equilibria of the game.
6.1 An Increase in the ”Size of the Market” (M)
Lemma 5 Consider two markets (sets of buyers) characterized by Λ1 = {λ1,...,λ M} and
Λ2 such that Λ1 ⊆ Λ2. Then for every equilibrium of market 1 in which Bi outsources, there
exists an equilibrium in market 2 in which Bi outsources as well.
Proof. Buyers are unrelated if integrated and as the value of outsourcing for each buyer,
SO (m), is shown in lemma 2 to depend positively on the number of outsourcing buyers,
m, then for each equilibrium of market 1, a similar equilibrium with at least the same set
of buyers outsourcing exists for market 2.
One implication of the lemma is that a particular buyer may integrate in all equilibria
of the smaller market, but outsource in some equilibria of the bigger one. Grossman and
Helpman (2002) derive a comparable result in their model, and relate it to anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that outsourcing is more prevalent in large economies. The result is also
reminiscent of Stigler’s (1951) celebrated hypothesis that industries would disintegrate as
they expand in size (and integrate again when in decline).
6.2 An Increase in Spillovers (γ)
In this section we compare two markets: 1,2 characterized by an identical set of buyers
{λ1,...,λ M}, and greater spillovers between designs in market 2 (γ2 >γ 1). For emphasis,
we denote explicitly by SO (m;γ) the equilibrium surplus and by nO (m;γ) the upstream
industry size conditional on γ.
22See McLaren (2000) and the examples discussed therein.
23Lemma 6
1. The number of ﬁrms outsourcing in a maximal outsourcing equilibrium is increasing
in γ: m2 ≥ m1.
2. If ψ000 ≤ 0, the number of suppliers per design is decreasing in γ for all m : ∀m ∈
{1,...,M},n O (m;γ2) ≤ nO (m;γ1).
3. If there are no setup costs savings (K0 (m)=0 ) and ψ000 ≤ 0, the (maximal out-
sourcing) equilibrium number of suppliers per buyer is at least as great in market 1:
nO (m2;γ2) ≤ nO (m1;γ1)
Proof.













αS (1 + γ (m − 1)) − nψ0¤ ∂sO
∂γ
+ αS (m − 1)sO
= ψ0∂sO
∂γ
+ αS (m − 1)sO
> 0,











Thus SO (m;γ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nγ and consequentially ∆(m,λ;γ)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nγ,∀λ.
By deﬁnition ∀m ≤ m1, ∆(m,λm;γ2) ≤ ∆(m,λm;γ1) ≤ 0. If ∆(m1 +1 ,λ m1+1;γ2) >
0t h e nO = {λ1,...,λ m1} is market 2’s equilibrium as well. Otherwise there exists an
equilibrium in market 2 with at least m1 + 1 outsourcing ﬁrms, and hence m2 ≥ m1.

























































≤ 0 and therefore nO (m;γ2) ≤ nO (m;γ1) (as as
SO is single-peaked).
3. When there are no setup costs savings (K0 (m) = 0) and ψ000 ≤ 0, it is shown in lemma
1t h a t
dnout(m)
dm < 0. Therefore by parts 1 and 2,
nO (m2;γ2) ≤ nO (m1;γ2) ≤ nO (m1;γ1).
McMillan (1995) argues that during the 80’s and the 90’s ﬁrms have increased their
outsourcing and subcontracting activities and at the same time also transformed the nature
of their supplier relations, with close relationships replacing arms’ length dealings. A central
characteristic of these new relationships is a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of suppliers
engaged. One rationale for such a decrease in the size of suppliers’ pool is given by Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1993). They argue that the diﬀusion of information technology has increased
the importance of non-contractible investments by suppliers, on such dimensions as quality,
responsiveness and innovation. As a result ﬁrms are likely to employ fewer suppliers, even
if the transaction costs of working with additional suppliers decrease.
The results of this section can be interpreted as oﬀering a complementary view to that
of Bakos and Brynjolfsson. One eﬀect of the increased use of information technology is
an improved ability to codify organizational know-how in the form of decision and support
systems. Thus knowledge acquired by a supplier becomes more transferable between diﬀer-
ent clients’ accounts, a fact which we model by an increase in spillovers. The implications
according to the lemma above are an increase in outsourcing and, under the conditions of
part 3., a decrease in the equilibrium supplier network size.
256.3 A Decrease in Per-Design Setup Costs (K (m))
In this section we compare two markets: 1,2 characterized by an identical set of buyers
{λ1,...,λ M}, and lower setup costs per design in market 2 , K2 (m) ≤ K1 (m), ∀m.
Lemma 7
1 .T h en u m b e ro fo u t s o u r c i n gﬁrms in a maximal outsourcing equilibria is higher in
market 2 than in market 1: m2 ≥ m1.
2 .F o ra n yg i v e nn u m b e ro fo u t s o u r c i n gb u y e r s ,m, the optimal number of suppliers per
design is higher in market 2: ∀m ∈ {1,...,M},n O (m;K2) ≥ nO (m;K1).
3. If there are no spillovers (γ =0 ) , the (maximal outsourcing) equilibrium number of
















m,nO (m;K1) − 1;K1
¢
+ K1 (m) − K2 (m)
> 0
and therefore nO (m;K2) ≥ nO (m;K1).
3. When γ = 0, it was established that
dnO(m)
dm ≥ 0. Therefore by parts 1 and 2,
nO (m2;K2) ≥ nO (m1;K2) ≥ nO (m1;K1).
It is interesting to note that the two types of economies of scope considered have similar
implications with respect to outsourcing but may have opposing implications for the size of
the suppliers’ network for each buyer.
267 Outsourcing and the Standardization of Inputs
Anecdotal evidence suggests that greater beneﬁts of outsourcing are achieved when some
standardization of the inputs acquired by diﬀerent buyers takes place. Japanese automo-
bile and computers manufacturers for example have reportedly embraced of late a degree
of ”openness” of supply, sharing input designs and suppliers in favor of their traditional
”closed” model.23 Often such standardization of inputs is associated with a ”loss of dis-
tinction” in the ﬁnal product. An example comes from the airline food industry.24 Over the
last decade, most major airlines have turned to outsourcing of in-ﬂight meal preparation,
while the activity was by and large vertically integrated beforehand. While the airlines
have been able to achieve cost-savings through outsourcing, there seems to be a consensus
that the variety of food being oﬀered has become rather limited, and pretty much standard,
at least for economy class travelers. A second example regards outsourcing of information
technology (IT) services, where several of the ﬁrms that turned to outsourcing solutions
from big IT contractors over the last decades, complained later that many of the services
received were minimally tailored ”oﬀ-the-shelf” products.25
We now show that it is very easy to modify our framework to accommodate such a
trade-oﬀ. Suppose that economies of scale to suppliers of taking several buyers’ designs
can only be materialized if the speciﬁcations of inputs used by diﬀerent buyers are (at least
partially) standardized. Assume that the value of each outsourcing buyer Bi product using
a standardized input instead of a fully customized one is lower by T>0. The equilibrium
investments by the parties are not aﬀected by these changes and are therefore as described
above. In a vertical equilibrium with m outsourcing buyers, the following conditions are
met:
∆(m,λi)+T<0f o r i ∈ {1,...,m},
∆(m,λi)+T ≥ 0f o r i ∈ {m +1 ,...,M},
where ∆(m,λi)i sd e ﬁn e da si n( 2 1 ) .
Some buyers would ﬁnd the gains from outsourcing large enough to oﬀset the loss in value
due to input standardization, while others would not. As in the basic model the gains from
outsourcing increase with the number of others ﬁrms that outsource (and standardize). The
model may also incorporate heterogeneity in the loss Ti to buyers due to the use of a non-
customized input. The analysis is similar to the one above: ﬁrms with highly customized
23See ”Japan discovers openness”, The Economist, October 16, 1993 and McMillan (1995).
24”A pressurized environment”, The Economist, March 13, 1999
25”The outing of outsourcing”, The Economist, November 25, 1995.
27input demands are less likely to outsource, and the share of buyers outsourcing changes
between diﬀerent equilibria.
When buyers are product market competitors, the standardization of inputs limits the
ability of ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate themselves from one another. In such a framework, the
”eﬃciency” beneﬁts from outsourcing to ﬁrms are traded-oﬀ against a more intensiﬁed
competition. To model this tradeoﬀ structurally, one would seek to integrate the model
presented here with a framework of product market competition between diﬀerentiated
producers. A ﬁrst attempt in this direction is taken in Levy (2003).
8 Discussion
In this section I discuss some of the modelling assumptions and the implications of alterna-
tives ones.
Convex costs of input production
Assuming linear variable costs, a pure strategies equilibrium with symmetric invest-
ments by suppliers does not exist under outsourcing.26 The ex-post division of the surplus
according to the respective Shapley values results in discontinuous best-response functions
in the investment stage subgame. The intuition is that at any symmetric proﬁle of invest-
ment, each supplier can increase its production allocation and its share of the surplus by a
discrete amount by increasing its investment inﬁnitesimally. The decreasing returns to scale
assumption introduces ”smoothness” to the production allocations (as well as some degree
of realism), and allows us to maintain a symmetric and therefore more tractable model.
Bargaining procedure
I have also attempted to model the multilateral bargaining between an outsourcing buyer
and its supplier network using a variation on an alternating oﬀers game with outside option
(such a bargaining procedure is employed for example in Bolton and Whinston (1993))
instead of the Shapley value. One drawback of such a formulation is that the buyer receives
(in the margin) the full return on its investment whenever it employs two or more suppliers.
Thus increasing the size of the supplier network above two does not have any eﬀect on the
buyer’s investment. As can be seen from (9), the marginal return is always increasing, but
never full when the Shapley value is used.
26Ar e s u l ti nt h i ss p i r i ti se s t a b l i s h e di nR a j a na n dZ ingales (1998), Lemma 1. An asymmetric equilibrium
does exist however.
28Hidden access oﬀers
In the model above, we have assumed that access oﬀers are publicly observed. An
alternative is to assume that oﬀers are observed only by the recipient supplier, and the
identity of all accepting suppliers is revealed at the beginning of the investment stage.
With such a formulation, it is possible to prove the existence of an equilibrium in which all
buyers grant access to the same set of suppliers Si = {1,..,n O (m)}, without any additional
assumptions. We outline the argument below.
• Buyers set an identical access fee FO that leaves suppliers indiﬀerent between accept-
ing the oﬀer and rejecting it.
FO = φ
j
i (b∗,e s∗) − ψ(s∗) − K (m)
where b∗ = bO ¡
nO (m)
¢
, s∗ = sO ¡
nO (m),m
¢









accepts any access oﬀer stipulating a fee F
j
i ≥ F∗ and
rejects any other oﬀer.




rejects access oﬀers stipulating a fee F
j
i > 0, main-
taining a belief that Bi has given access to a number of suppliers suﬃciently high so
that they would end up making a loss from the transaction.
Note however that this game admits many other equilibria.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 A second-order condition for the supplier’s investment problem
In here we calculate a second-order condition for supplier investment problem, (7), and
derive a suﬃcient condition for concavity to hold locally. As an intermediate step, we begin
by calculating the derivative of the supplier’s production allocation, x
j






























29where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Then as c(x,s)=b c(x)−αSxs, the system of ﬁrst-order
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Note that at the symmetric allocation, x
j
i = 1
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30Deﬁne c =i n f{b c00 (x)|x ∈ [0,1]}. By assumption c > 0. Hence
(αS)
2














































A.2 Derivatives of surplus terms
The derivatives of the surplus function SO (m,n) calculated here are used in numerous
proofs in the main text. All derivations are for the many buyers/many suppliers case. The






















































































































































































































αS [1 + γ (m − 1)]









(1 + γ (m − 1))
+
αS [1 + γ (m − 1)]
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(1 + γ (m − 1))
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αS (1 + γ (m − 1))
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Thus ψ000 ≤ 0i sas u ﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for ∂2sO
∂m∂n, ∂2sO
∂γ∂n < 0, and
therefore also for
∂2[SO(m,n)]
∂γ∂n < 0. Also it is suﬃcient for the eﬀect on SO (m,n) due to
spillovers (the term in brackets in (26)) to be negative. In the case where K0 (m)=0t h e n
∂2[SO(m,n)]
∂m∂n < 0a sw e l l .
32A.3 Single-peakedness of SO (n) for a parametric example
In the following example we consider a parameterization of the basic model of section 3
with a quadratic disutility of eﬀort function, ψ(x)=x2
2 .











































and one can further show that h0
1 (n) < −K for all n ≥ n1 and that h00
1 (n) > 0i fa n do n l y
if n ≥ n2,w h e r en2 >n 1.A l s oh0
2 (n) > 0, h00
2 (n) < 0i se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed.
Claim 1 SO (n) has interior single peak under the following (suﬃcient) conditions
1. h0
1 (0) > 0
2. h0
2 (n2) <K
Proof. Note ﬁrst that h0
1 (n) > 0 if and only if (αB)
2 > (n +3 )
(αS)2
2 + K (n +1 )
3.
As the right-hand side is increasing in n, h1 (n) changes sign at most once and, as long as
h0
1 (0) > 0, has an interior single peak.
We now turn to SO (n)=h1 (n)+h2 (n). Under the conditions above it is clear that
SO 0 (0) > 0a n dt h a tSO 0 (n)=h0
1 (n)+h0
2 (n) < −K +K =0f o ra l ln ≥ n2.F u r t h e r m o r e
SO 00 (n) < 0 for all n<n 2 and therefore SO (n) has a single peak, located in (0,n 2).
33A.4 Access game
In this section we derive suﬃcient conditions under which a buyer, when making a choice
between two suppliers, always prefers giving access to the supplier with the higher number
of additional designs. As is argued in the main text, a direct implication is that in all
equilibria of the access game, buyers oﬀer access to the same set of suppliers.
Suppose that a buyer Bi g i v e sa c c e s st oas e tSi of ni suppliers, and that supplier k is
taking mk ≥ 1 designs in total. The overall surplus generated by vertical structure i is then



















are the equilibrium investments. While {mk}
ni
k=1 are discrete
variables, we consider next the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal change in mj for some j ∈ {1,..,n i}
on the symmetric equilibrium surplus.

































































Denote by bk ≡ αsxk




.T h u s
dS(m1,...,mni)












∂mj > 0a n dt h a t
∂sk
i
∂mj < 0 for all k 6= j, and the necessary
and suﬃcient condition then implies that the direct positive eﬀect of an increase in mk on
supplier k’s equilibrium investment is strong enough, compared with the indirect eﬀect on
all other suppliers investments, so that the weighted sum of the eﬀects is not too negative
(compared with the savings in setup costs). Given a parametric formulation of the model,
it is possible to derive exact restrictions under which the condition holds.
Finally, if the necessary and suﬃcient condition holds for all (m1,...,m ni) then the eﬀect
on overall surplus of a discrete increase in a certain mk is also positive.
A.5 Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
1. Provided that K0 (m)=0a n dψ000 ≤ 0, it can be seen from (26) above that
∂2[SO(m,n)]
∂m∂n ≤

































Given the single-peakedness of SO (m,n)t h e nnO (m2) ≤ nO (m1).
2. If γ =0 ,sO (m,n) is independent of m implying
∂2[SO(m,n)]






















m1,n O (m1) − 1
¢¤
≥ 0.





m2,n O (m1) − 1
¢
≥ 0.
35The single-peakedness of SO (m,n)i m p l i e snO (m2) ≥ nO (m1).
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